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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondent Gavilan Operating Incorporated submits that there
are no questions for review by this court which justify the
granting of Petitioners request for a Writ of Certiorari• Gavilan
disagrees

with

Petitioners

claim

as

set

forth

under

ISSUES

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW in its Petition for Certiorari and submits
that the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed and reconciled the
holdings of this court in Mollerup v Storage Systems International,
569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) and United States v. Looslev 551 P.2d 506
(Utah 1976) and correctly concluded that in redeeming the property
Windriver was required to pay the amount of the bid price not the
amount claimed as the debt.

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals1 decision in this case is Tech-Fluids
Services, Inc. vs. Gavilan Operating, Inc. 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 40,
P.2d

( Utah 1990).
JURISDICTION

The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed February 16,
1990. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(5) and Rule 45 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure grant this Court discretion to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

1

STATUTES INVOLVED
Rule

69

(f)(1), (2),

and

(3) of the Utah

Rules

Procedure.
(f) Redemption from sale.
(1)

Who May Redeem.
Property sold subject to
redemption, or any part sold separately, may
be redeemed by the following persons or their
successors in interest:
(1)
The judgment
debtor;
(2)
a creditor having a lien by
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or
on some share or part thereof, subsequent to
that on which the property was sold.

(2)

Redemption—How
made.
At the time of
redemption the person seeking the same may
make payment of the amount required to the
person from whom the property is being
redeemed, or for him to the officer who made
the sale, or his successor in office. At the
same time the redemptioner must produce to the
officer or person from whom he seeks to
redeem, and serve with his notice to the
officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket
of the judgment under which he claims the
right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the
record thereof certified by the recorder; (2)
an assignment properly acknowledged or proved,
where the same is necessary to establish his
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his
agent showing the amount then actually due on
the lien.

(3)

Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid. The
property may be redeemed from the purchaser
within six months after the sale on paying the
amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon
in addition, together with the amount of any
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum
for fire insurance and necessary maintenance,
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the
property which the purchaser may have paid

2

of

Civil

thereon after the purchase, with interest on
such amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a
creditor having a lien prior to that of the
person seeking redemption, other than the
judgment under which said purchase was made,
the amount of such lien, with interest.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
Tech Fluids brought this action to foreclose a $69,708.00
mechanics lien on an oil and gas well. The trial court entered its
order foreclosing the mechanics lien and directing the Sheriff of
Duchesne County to sell the well. The Sheriff's Sale was held July
2, 1987. Tech Fluid bid $4,000.00 and became the purchaser of the
well at the sale. Wind River Resources Corporation as the assignee
of Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the owner of the well,
redeemed the property from the sale. Plaintiff brought an Order To
Show Cause against Wind River challenging the redemption and
requesting the court to order that the redemption by Wind River was
invalid and that Plaintiff owned the well.
After argument, the court upheld the redemption and ruled that
Wind River was the owner of the well.
There was no evidentiary hearing
appeal.

on the issues

raised on

The facts were stipulated by the parties. Wind River set

forth in its Memorandum the facts it claimed were relevant and
undisputed. (R.547-549) Plaintiff, in its Reply Memorandum, agreed
with the statement of facts. (R.480)
3

Plaintiff appealed the Trial Courts decision on four grounds.
The matter was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Court
of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision ruled

against Plaintiff on all four grounds.
The real party now in interest is Gavilan Operating, Inc.
Gavilan Operating, Inc. , acquired Wind River Resource Corporation's
interest during the appeal and an order was signed by the Court of
Appeals substituting Gavilan Operating, Inc., as the real party in
interest.
STATEMENT OP THE FACTS
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation (Paiute) was the owner of an
oil and gas well known as Paiute-Walker 13-ND1 located in Duchesne
County, Utah.

Plaintiff claims to have provided services and

materials to the well for which it was not paid.
1984, Plaintiff

In November,

filed a mechanics lien on the well property

claiming it was owed $69,708.00.

When the claim was not paid

Plaintiff instituted this action to foreclose the lien.

(R.l) On

December 18, 1985, Paiute filed a Petition for Bankruptcy in the
United States Bankruptcy court for the District of Utah. (R.157)
On May 18, 1987, Plaintiff obtained an order terminating the
Automatic Stay and ordering the trustee to abandon its interest in
well 13-ND1.

(R.427) Plaintiff then immediately obtained from the

District Court, an Order directing the Sheriff of Duchesne County
4

to post notice and conduct a public sale of the well property.
(R.426, 435) The foreclosure sale was held on July 2, 1987. L.A.
Dever, counsel for J. K. Foster, entered a bid of $4,000.00 as a
credit bid in favor of Plaintiff. (R.443-444)
Paiute let it be known that its redemption rights were for
sale. Plaintiff demanded a Quitclaim Deed from Paiute which Paiute
refused to give.

(Stipulated Fact No. 7, R.548)

Plaintiff

obtained from the County Clerk a Writ of Execution dated December
10, 1987.

The Writ instructed the Sheriff of Duchesne County to

execute on Paiute1s redemption rights. (R.446) That Writ was not
served on Paiute but only posted on the well.
Fact No. 9, R.549)

(R.448, Stipulated

The Sheriff scheduled the Sherifffs sale under

the Writ for January 5, 1988. (R.449)
On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned to Wind River Resources
Corporation
(R.462, )

its

redemption

rights

on

the property

involved.

On January 1, 1988, Wind River Resources Corporation

delivered to the Sheriff's office of Duchesne County a copy of the
Assignment of Rights of Redemption, an acknowledged Notice of
Redemption setting forth the calculation of the redemption price,
the property to be redeemed and the basis for its right to redeem,
(R.463) and a cashier's check in the amount of $4,310.00 (R.457)
The Sheriff issued a Sheriff's Redemption Certificate to Wind
River.

(R.465)
5

Plaintiff then had an Order to Show Cause issued requiring
Wind River to appear before the court in Duchesne, Utah on the 19th
day of January, 1988 to show cause, if any, why a Sheriff's Deed
should not issue to the Plaintiff, why the Assignment of the
Redemption Rights from Paiute to Wind River should not be found
null and void, or alternatively why the Sheriff of Duchesne County
should not issue a Sheriff's Certificate as a result of Plaintiff's
claimed sale of July 2, 1987.

(R.474)

The parties appeared before the court on January 19, 1988.
Both parties argued their positions and submitted legal memoranda.
The court then entered its ruling denying the relief requested in
the order to show cause and concluding the Plaintiff had no right,
title, or interest in the subject well.

(R.569, )

On February 10, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion claiming that
Wind River Resources Corporation was required to pay the entire
amount of Plaintiff's lien of $89,000.00 to properly redeem. That
motion was denied by the court on February 29, 1988.
court then signed its Conclusions of Law and Order.

(R.611) The
(R.612, 616)

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF»S PETITION PROVIDES NO REASON
UNDER RULE 46 OP THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BY
WHICH THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that
a Writ of Certiorari is granted only when there are "special and
6

important reasons". Those reasons are set forth in Rule 46.

None

of those reasons apply to this case.
Plaintiff in seeking a Writ of Certiorari urges that there is
a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals in this
case and the case of Mollerup vs. Storage Systems International 569
P.2d 1121 (Utah 1977).

In making that argument Plaintiff ignores

the reasoning and analysis of Judge Orme in writing for the
unanimous panel from the Court of Appeals as he distinguished this
case from Mollerup.

The Court of Appeals found that the case of

United States v. Loosley

551 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1976) was better

precedent for the instant case stating that "The requirements at
issue in this case are identical to those in Loosley." 128 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 43. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals is sound and
there is no reason to grant the Writ of Certiorari petitioned for
here.
POINT II THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE TEST OF LOOSLEY WAS MET IN THIS
CASE.
This Court in Loosley concluded that the procedural aspects of
redemption did not prejudice the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
and

therefore

substantial

compliance

by

the

redeemer

was

sufficient. The court then found the same to be true in this case
and applied the Loosley rule in the case before the court.
also

See

Gesa Federal Credit Union vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company
7

105 Wash.2d 248, 713 P.2d 728, 731-33 (1986), Household Finance
Company vs. Bacon 58 Or. App. 267, 648 P.2d 421, 423 (1982).
Furthermore, in this particular case there was more than
substantial compliance with the procedural provisions of Rule 69.
Plaintiff has argued that the assignment of redemption was not
properly notarized because the seal was not ascertainable from the
face of the document.

The only document the Plaintiff has ever

produced is a copy. Copies generally do not on their face show the
imprint of the seal.

The original assignment is apparently still

in the possession of either the Sheriff or Wind River.

Plaintiff

argues there is no affidavit setting forth the amount owed.

The

document entitled Notice of Redemption does set forth the amount
owed and is

sworn to under oath, and meets the requirements of

being an affidavit.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that a copy of the judgment docket
was not submitted to the Sheriff.

Plaintiff fails to point out to

the Court that it did not follow proper procedural rules and did
not have any judgment entered or docketed. Plaintiff should not be
allowed to complain about failure to produce a record which
Plaintiff has failed to properly file with the Court.
POINT III.
WIND RIVER PAID THE SHERIFF THE CORRECT
AMOUNT WHEN IT REDEEMED THE PROPERTY FROM THE SHERIFFS
FORECLOSURE SALE.
Wind River, at the time it redeemed the property, paid the
8

purchase price of $4,000.00, interest at the rate of 6 percent and
costs as required by Rule 69(f)(3).

Plaintiff claims that Wind

River should have paid to the Sheriff the entire amount of the debt
represented by its Mechanics Lien.

This argument was considered

and rejected by the Court of Appeals. Justice Orme appropriately
pointed out that the argument by Plaintiff and the case relied on
by Plaintiff are contrary to the clear language of Rule 69(f) (3).
To illustrate the error of Plaintiff's claim one only needs to
apply the names of the parties to the statutory provision in
question and it becomes clear that the provision relied on by the
Plaintiff has no application in this case.

The provision in

question states:
[I]f the purchaser (Plaintiff) is also a creditor having
a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption
(Wind River) other than the judgment under which said
purchase was made, the amount of such Lien with interest.
In this case, Plaintiff does not have a lien on the property "prior
to that of the person seeking redemption"

i.e. Wind River.

The

property was redeemed By Wind River as an assignee of Paiute.
Plaintiff does not have another lien on the property in addition to
the one that has been foreclosed.

This particular provision

of

Rule 69(f) (3) has no application to the facts of this case. It is
to be applied in cases in which there are numerous liens on the
property by both the redeeming party and the purchaser.
As pointed out by Justice Orem, " Tech-Fluid does not claim to
9

have any lien on the well other than the one which permitted the
original foreclosure sale.

Under the express language of the

statute, therefore, is only entitled to the amount of the purchase
bid plus 6 percent interest."

128 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43.

CONCLUSION
Gavilan respectfully requests that the Court deny the petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this

( g

day of April, 1990.

McKEACHNIB^/ALLRED & BUNNELL
Attorneys for Respondent
By:
QLar^B. Alfred

By:
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APPENDIX
Court of Appeals decision
Conclusions of Law dated February 29, 1988, by District Judge
Dennis L. Draney in the Eighth Judicial District Court of
Duchesne County, State of Utah.
Order dated March 8, 1988, by District Judge Dennis L. Draney
in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State
of Utah.
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CODB^CO
128 Utah Adv. RCP, 40
Provo.uuh
the McCaffcrys should have acquired on their own against all of the defendants in the lien action
automobile. See id
except Paiute. Because of the pending bankr3. See Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-301 to-412 uptcy, the district court specifically declined to
(1988). However, McCaffery does not contend he adjudicate the claim as between Paiute and
actually complied with these provisions.
Tech-Fluid.
4. We note that even if we were to find that §31AIn May 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained an
22-309(6) was available to McCaffery, this court
order
lifting the automatic stay as it applied to
would not be the correct forum in which to pursue
his claim. The statute specifies arbitration as the the lien action and ordering the trustee to
abandon her interest in the well. Thereafter,
proper recourse.
Tech-Fluid obtained an order from the district court directing the sale of Paiute's interest
in the well. No judgment of foreclosure
against Paiute was ever entered or docketed
Cite as
128 Utah Adv. Rep. 40
prior to the court-ordered sale, a procedure
which, while unorthodox, was never objected
IN THE
to by any party. A sheriffs sale of the well
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
was held on July 2, 1987. Tech-Fluid was the
only bidder at the sale and purchased the
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC.,
property with a $4,000 credit bid.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
In the fall of 1987, Tech-Fluid discovered
v.
that Paiute intended to assign its redemption
GAVILAN OPERATING, INC., Paiute Oil &
right. Tech-Fluid demanded a quitclaim
Mining Corp., et al.,
deed, but Paiute refused. On December 14,
Defendants and Respondents.
1987, Tech-Fluid obtained from the county
clerk a writ of execution instructing the sheriff
No. 890067-CA
to execute on Paiute's redemption right. A
FILED: February 16, 1990
public sale of the redemption right was set for
January 5,1988.
Seventh District, Duchesne County
On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned its
Honorable Dennis L. Draney
redemption right to Wind River Resources
Corporation. On January 1, 1988, the final
ATTORNEYS:
day of the redemption period, Wind River
Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae,
exercised the right of redemption by delivering
Vernal, for Appellant
to the sheriffs office of Duchesne County 1)
Clark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeachnie,
an inadequately notarized copy of the assignVernal, for Respondents
ment of Paiute's right of redemption; 2) an
acknowledged notice of redemption setting
Before Judges Bullpck,1 Jackson, and Orme.
forth the calculation of the redemption
amount, the property to be redeemed, and the
OPINION
basis for its right to redeem; and 3) a cashier's
ORME, Judge:
check in the amount of $4,310. The sheriff
Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. issued a sheriffs redemption certificate to
appeals from an adverse ruling concerning the Wind River.
On January 5 and 6, Tech-Fluid attempted
redemption of. property it purchased at a
to proceed with the scheduled execution sale
sheriffs sale. We affirm.
and purchase the redemption right. However,
FACTS
the sheriff would not accept Tech-Fluid's bid
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the until the district court determined whether a
predecessor of respondent Gavilan Operating, redemption right could be subject to execuInc., had an ownership interest in an oil and tion.
gas well located in Duchesne County. AppelOn January 8, Tech-Fluid obtained an
lant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. supplied serv- order directing the sheriff to show cause why
ices and materials to the well for which it was he should not issue his deed to Tech-Fluid
not paid. In November 1984, it filed a mech- because of an invalid redemption by Wind
anics' lien on the well claiming that $69,708 River. The district court subsequently held a
was owing. In January 1985, Tech-Fluid hearing on the order to show cause and ruled
commenced an action to foreclose its lien that 1) the assignment was valid, 2) the right
naming Paiute and several other entities as of redemption could not be executed upon, 3)
defendants.
Wind River was entitled to redemption
In December 1985, Paiute filed a voluntary because it substantially complied with the
reorganization petition under chapter 11 of the statutory requirements for redemption, and 4)
Bankruptcy Code. A trustee was subsequently Tech-Fluid had no further interest in the
appointed. In February 1986, the state district well. Tech-Fluid filed a further motion, clacourt entered a judgment of foreclosure as iming that Wind River was required to pay not
only the $4,000 but the entire amount of the
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lien. The motion was denied and the court
signed its conclusions of law and order. TechFluid brought this appeal.
On appeal, Tech-Fluid raises several arguments. First, it argues that, although the
trustee abandoned the well, she did not
abandon the right to redeem the well in the
event of foreclosure. If this were true, the
assignment from Paiute to Wind River would
be invalid because Paiute would have had no
interest in the redemption right, which would
have been held, until its expiration, by the
trustee. Second, Tech-Fluid argues that the
court erred in holding that it could not execute
on the redemption right. Third, it argues that
the redemption was unsuccessful because Wind
River failed to strictly comply with the redemption statute. Finally, Tech-Fluid argues
that Wind River was required to pay the entire
amount of the lien before it could redeem the
property.
ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION
Tech-Fluid argues that the trustee never
abandoned her right to redeem the well2 and
therefore Paiute had no right which it could
assign to Wind River. On the other hand,
Gavilan, as successor to Paiute, argues that
when the trustee abandoned her interest in the
well, she necessarily abandoned any right to
redeem which might arise in the event of foreclosure. The trial court heard arguments from
counsel at the order to show cause hearing.
Subsequent to the hearing, the parties submitted memoranda to support their positions.
The court ruled that the trustee had abandoned the well long before the redemption right
arose. The evidence and the law support the
district court's conclusion and therefore we
affirm.
Tech-Fluid concedes that a right of redemption is a property interest.3 Moreover, it is
clear that upon the filing of the bankruptcy
proceeding, the entire "bundle of rights"
Paiute had in the well, including its right to
redeem in the event of any sale subject to
Utah R. Civ. P. 69, see note 3, supra, became
part of the bankruptcy estate.4 However, we
do not agree that the trustee had to explicitly
abandon her right of redemption for it to
revert to the debtor,5 any more than she had
to explicitly abandon other rights of ownership, such as the right to collect royalties or
the right to explore and develop or even the
right of possession.
According to the bankruptcy code, "the
court may order the trustee to abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to
the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. §554(b)
(1989). Courts and commentators have recognized that once abandoned, "the property
stands as if no bankruptcy had been filed and
the debtor enjoys the same claim to it and

interest in it as he held previous to the filing
of bankruptcy." In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr.
581, 591 (D. Utah 1981) (emphasis added).
"Thus, abandonment constitutes a divestiture]
of all interests in property that were property
of the estate." 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 1554.02(21 (15th ed. 1989) (emphasis
added).
The trial court's conclusion in this case is
consistent with Cruseturner and Collier. We
see no reason why the right to redeem should
be treated differently than any other property
interest that the trustee has in the property
prior to abandonment. On the contrary, it
would be anomalous to view the right of redemption as an independent property interest
which stayed with the trustee when she abandoned the property to which it pertained. The
right to redeem is such that it can only be
exercised after property has been sold at a
foreclosure sale, and only those with an interest in the property at the time of the sale (or
their successors in interest) have a right to
redeem. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(1). See also
Layton v. Thayne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th
Cir. 1943), cert, denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944).
It is inconsistent to suggest that a trustee,
having abandoned property and consequently
bring divested of all interest therein, would
still retain a right to redeem, at least absent
some expressed and unambiguous intent by the
trustee to retain that right.* We hold, therefore, that "divestiture of all interests in the
property" includes divestiture of the trustee's
right to redeem.
Tech-Fluid points to no compelling authority inconsistent with the trial court's and
our conclusion. On the other hand, although
our attention has been drawn to no case deciding the precise issue before us, the Fourth
Circuit has at least stated in dicta that when
the trustee abandons her interest in property
of the estate, "the property and the right of
redemption remains in, or reverts to, the
bankrupt." In re Webb, 54 F.2d 1065, 1067
(4th Cir. 1932).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
redemption right belonged to Paiute after the
well was abandoned, and that Paiute could
properly assign that right to Wind River.
COMPLIANCE WITH REDEMPTION
STATUTE
The district court concluded that Wind
River had only to comply substantially, rather
than strictly, with the requirements of Rule
69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court also concluded that Wind River had
substantially complied with those requirements. We agree on both scores.
Rule 69(0(2) provides that, at the time of
redemption,
the redemptioner must produce to
the officer or person from whom he

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

42

Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc.
m Vuh Adr,fop,40

seeks to redeem, and serve with his
notice to the officer: (1) a certified
copy of the docket of the judgment
under which he claims the right to
redeem, or, if he redeems upon a
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record thereof certified
by the recorder; (2) an assignment,
properly acknowledged or proved
where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an affidavit by
himself or his agent showing the
amount then actually due on the
lien.
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(0(2).
Tech-Fluid argues that the trial court erred
when it applied a substantial compliance test
to determine whether Wind River had properly
redeemed. Tech-Fluid cites Mollerup v.
Storage Sys. Int'l, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977),
and argues that strict compliance with the
statutory requirements was necessary. In
Mollerup, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he right of redemption has long been recognized as a substantive right to be exercised
in strict accord with statute^ terms." Id. at
1124.
Gavilan, on the other hand, argues that
substantial compliance with the requirements
of Rule 69(0(2) was sufficient under United
States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976).
In Loosley, the Court stated that
statutes dealing with redemption are
regarded as remedial in character
and should be given liberal construction and application to permit a
property owner who can pay his
debts to do so, and thus make his
creditor whole, and save his property. Therefore, if a debtor, acting
in good faith, has substantially
complied with the procedural requirements of the rule in such a
manner that the lender mortgagee is
not injured or adversely affected,
and is getting what he is entitled to,
the law will not aid in depriving the
mortgagor of his property for mere
falling short of exact compliance
with technicalities.
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
Mollerup and Loosley, though seemingly
inconsistent, are readily reconciled. Very
simply, not all redemption provisions are
alike. Courts, in evaluating the necessity for
strict compliance in these kinds of cases, focus
upon the nature of the statutory requirements
and the likelihood of prejudice. If failure to
adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive right of one of the parties and possibly
prejudice that party, then courts require strict
compliance. On the other hand, if the requirements are merely procedural and will not
prejudice one of the parties, substantial com-
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pliance is sufficient.
The Washington Supreme Court addressed
these distinctions directly in Gesa Fed. Credit
Union v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d
248, 713 P.2d 728, 731-33 (1986) (en banc).
The Gesa court recognized that the Washington redemption statute involved "a number
of provisions, some which confer a statutory
right ... and some of which establish a procedure by which that right is perfected .... 'A
statute is remedial when it relates to practice,
procedure, or remedies and does not affect a
substantive or vested right." 713 P.2d at 732
(quoting Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d
170, 685 P.2d 1074, 1081 (1984)). The Gesa
court went on to hold that the technical failure
involved in that case was harmless because the
failure did not affect a substantive right and
appellant was not prejudiced. Id. at 732-33. See
also Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon, 58
Or. App. 267, 648 P.2d 421, 423 (1982)
(technical inconsistencies with statutory requirements did not adversely affect rights of
purchaser).
Our Supreme Court in Mollerup was construing Rule 69(0(3) which sets a time limit of
six months in which redemption must be
made. This provision clearly affects a substantiverightof the purchaser. All right, title and
interest in the property do not vest in the
purchaser at a foreclosure sale until the redemption period has expired. Local Realty Co.
v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770, 772
(1938). "[T]he interest of the purchaser is
[merely] an equitable interest, subject to be
lost or cancelled or taken away by the debtor
or any redemptioner or their assigns upon
payment of the sale price with interest." 85
P.2d at 772. If there is no redemption within
the prescribed period, the purchaser is then
entitled to a conveyance of the property. Utah
R. Civ. P. 69(0(5). To allow redemption
beyond the six-month period inevitably
compromises and prejudices the purchaser's
interest. Consequently, the Court concluded
that absent some significant facts to "move the
conscience" of the Court, it would not extend
the redemption period. Mollerup, 569 P.2d at
1124.
Loosley, like the case before us, involved
Rule 69(0(2). A brief recitation of the facts in
Loosley is helpful. The Loosleys failed to pay
a government loan. The government then
foreclosed on a property interest of the Loosleys. At a foreclosure sale, the Griffiths
purchased the property interest. The Loosleys
then assigned their right of redemption to the
Hammons, who further assigned the right to
Basic Investment, Inc. One day prior to the sixmonth redemption period, Basic served a
notice of redemption on the Griffiths' attorney, accompanied with a check for the
correct redemption amount. They did not
serve any of the documents specified in Rule
69(0(2). Eight days after the tender, the Gri-
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ffiths returned the check and rejected the an order from the district court to sell
tender based upon Basic's failure to comply Paiute's interest in the well. In its haste, Techwith Rule 69(0(2).
Fluid did not first obtain a foreclosure judgThe trial court in Loosley concluded that ment determining the correct amount owing.
because the Griffiths had failed to adhere to
Under a normal foreclosure scenario,* the
the requirements of Rule 69(0(2), their rede- judgment creditor first obtains a foreclosure
mption failed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme judgment determining the correct amount due
Court reversed. It recognized that the failure and owning. Then, property subject to the
to comply with the technical requirements of judgment is sold at a foreclosure sale. See
Rule 69(f)(2) had no adverse effects on the Utah R. Civ. P. 69(a)-(e). If the proceeds
Griffiths. 551 P.2d at 508. It then held that from the sale are inadequate to pay the entire
since the assignments were proper, the Griff- amount determined in the foreclosure judgiths had tendered the correct amount within ment, "[tjhe clerk must, as a mere ministerial
the prescribed time, and the Loosleys had duty, enter a deficiency judgment against the
failed to object, the redemption was good. Id.
(debtor]." First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89
Based upon the authority discussed above, Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936). Without
and in particular Loosley, we affirm that an initial foreclosure judgment, the clerk has
substantial compliance is the proper test under no basis upon which to calculate a deficiency.
Rule 69(0(2). Moreover, because the Court Thus, the clerk cannot enter a deficiency
found substantial compliance in Loosley, we judgment and absent such a judgment he or
are obliged to find it in this case. Tech- she cannot properly issue a writ of execution.
Fluid's position is even weaker than the Gri- Consequently, the clerk in this case improperly
ffiths' position was in Loosley. Wind River issued the writ of execution.
not only tendered the correct amount within
Tech-Fluid should not now be heard to
the redemption period but also tendered some complain. It chose its own course of action by
proof of the assignment between Paiute and failing to first obtain a foreclosure judgment.
Wind River and a document entitled "Notice We hold that Tech-Fluid was not entitled to
of Redemption" giving additional facts about execute upon Paiute's redemption right.1*
its entitlement to redeem. Although Wind
AMOUNT OF REDEMPTION
River could surely have done more to comply
Finally, Tech-Fluid argues that Wind River
with the requirements of Rule 69(0(2),7 it
complied more fully than did the defendants was obligated to pay not only the amount of
in Loosley. Additionally, as in Loosley, Tech- the bid but the entire amount of the alleged
Fluid did not challenge the validity of the debt. Rule 69(0(3) provides in pertinent part:
tender until several days after the tender and
The property may be redeemed
after the redemption period had run.
from the purchaser ... on paying
the amount of his purchase with 6
The requirements at issue in this case are
percent thereon in addition ... and,
identical to those in Loosley. They are proceif the purchaser is also a creditor
dural in nature and do not affect any substahaving a lien prior to that of the
ntive rights of the purchaser.8 Tech-Fluid has
person seeking redemption, other
failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the
than the judgment under which said
failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of
purchase was made, the amount of
Rule 69(0(2). Consequently, we affirm the
such lien, with interest.
district court's holding that Wind River substantially complied with the redemption pro- Utah R. Civ. P. 69(0(3) (emphasis added).
visions and that such compliance is all that is Tech-Fluid does not claim to have had any
lien on the well other than the one which
necessary.
permitted the original foreclosure sale. Under
EXECUTION ON REDEMPTION RIGHT
the express language of the statute, therefore,
Having concluded that Wind River other- it was only entitled to the amount of the
wise properly redeemed, we now address purchase bid plus six percent interest. See
whether Tech-Fluid could execute upon Madsen, Equitable Considerations of MortPaiute's redemption right. We hold that it gage Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A
could not.
Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah L.
We need not address the more general issue Rev. 327, 343-44.
of whether a judgment creditor could ever
Once again, Tech-Fluid is bound by its
execute upon the judgment debtor's right of
choices, including the decision to bid only
redemption because Tech-Fluid failed to
$4,000 on the well. As the only bidder at the
obtain a foreclosure judgment upon which a
saJe, Tech-Fluid established the value of the
post-foreclosure sale deficiency judgment
well for redemption purposes and placed itself
could be based and absent such judgment,
in the predicament it now finds itself. See
there was nothing on which any execution
Kries v. Allen Carpet, Inc., 146 Ariz. 348, 706
could be premised. When Tech-Fluid receP.2d 360, 363-64 (1985) (en banc); Johnson
ived relief from the automatic stay regarding
v., Zahn, 380 111. 320, 44 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1942).
the well, it immediately proceeded to obtain
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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According to Rule 69(0(3), Wind River was of the court order directing sale of the well. Moreonly obligated to pay what Tech Fluid paid over, there are no facts in the record to suggest an
excuse for the inadequate notarization of the assigplus the specified interest.
nment. Finally, Wind River could surely have sub*
CONCLUSION
mined an affidavit stating the alleged amount due
We affirm the rulings of the district court on the lien.
and hold that: 1) The trustee abandoned her S. The procedural rules of 69(0(2) were likely
right of redemption when she abandoned the created for the benefit and protection of the sheriff,
well; 2) Wind River substantially complied so that he may be guided in what to require to make
certain that redemption is in order. See, e.g.. Houwith the technical requirements of Rule sehold Fm. Corp. v. Bacon, 58 Or. App. 267, 648
69(0(2) and therefore properly redeemed; 3) P.2d 421,423 (1982).
having failed to obtain a foreclosure judg- 9. The mechanics' lien statute specifically provides
ment, Tech-Fluid could not execute on the that mechanics1 liens are foreclosed in the same
redemption right; and 4) Wind River was only manner, and subject to the same right of redempobligated under Rule 69(0(3) to tender the tion, as in the case of mortgages. See Utah Code
Ann. §38-1-15 (1988).
amount of the purchase plus interest.
10. Having based our conclusion on Tech-Fluid's
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
failure to obtain a foreclosure judgment, we do not
mean to suggest that Tech-Fluid would have preWE CONCUR:
vailed had this fact been otherwise. There is apparJ. Robert Bullock, Judge
ently little case law addressing the issue of whether a
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
mortgage creditor may execute on the redemption
right of the mortgage debtor. However, Gavilan
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting directs our attention to Johnson v. Zahn, 380 111.
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 320, 44 N.E.2d 15 (1942). In Johnson, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a lien did not attach to the
§78-3-24(10) (1989).
2. It is noteworthy that the trustee never claimed she judgment debtor's equity of redemption arising
had somehow retained the right to redeem Paiute's from the judgment creditor's deficiency judgment.
interest in the well. On the contrary, we are prese- 44N.E.2datl9.
nted with her affidavit stating she always considered
the redemption right abandoned right along with the
well. However, that affidavit was not submitted to
the trial court, is introduced for the first time on
Cite as
appeal, and, therefore, is not part of the record
128 Utah Adv. Rep. 44
properly before us. Accordingly, it plays no part in
our decision.
IN T H E
3. A right of redemption is created in Utah by Rule
U
T
A
H
COURT
OF A P P E A L S
69(0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides, in pertinent part, that "[property sold
subject to redemption, or any part sold separately, Garth YOUD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
may be redeemed by the following persons or their
successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor ....*
v.
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(0(1). "Successors in interest" Richard B. JOHNSON; and Howard, Lewis &
clearly include assignees. See Utah R. Civ. P. Peterson, a partnership,
69(0(2X2).
Defendants and Respondents.
4. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate is
created which includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commence- No. 880431-CA
ment of the case.' 11 U.S.C. §541 (1979). Accor- FILED: February 21,1990
ding to Collier, *[a]n equity of redemption comes
within the scope of 'all legal or equitable interests Fourth District, Utah County
of the debtor in property.** 4 W. Collier, Collier on Honorable George E. Bailif
Bankruptcy 1541.07[3] (15th ed. 1989) (quoting 11
ATTORNEYS:
U.S.C. §541 (1979)). See also Layton v. Layton, 44
Roy G. Haslam and Elizabeth S. Whitney,
Utah 349,140 P.2d 759,761 (1943).
5. Tech-Fluid relies upon §554(d) of the bankruSalt Lake City, for Appellant
ptcy code which states that "property of the estate Stephen B. Nebeker, Thomas L. Kay and Paul
that is not abandoned ... and that is not administD. Newman, Salt Lake City, for
ered ... remains property of the estate." 11 U.S.C.
Respondents
§554(d)(1989).
6. We need not decide whether the trustee could Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and
have specifically retained the right to redeem the Jackson.
property even while abandoning the property. The
trustee in this case chose not to attempt to retain
ORDER
that right, see note 2, supra, and in the absence of
any indication to that effect, the right to redeem
This court, having considered the responautomatically parsed to Paiute upon abandonment
dent's petition for rehearing and appellant's
of the well.
7. Wind River could have complied more fully in reply, in which both parties stipulated that the
several respects. Although there was no judgment
docketed. Wind River could have submitted a copy
ITT A l l
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ADDENDUM NO. 5

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Wind River
Resources Corporation
3 63 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 34078
Telephone; (301) 789-4908
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TECH-FLUID SERVICE,

INC.,
i

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
PAIUTE O I L & MINING C O R P . ,
SAM O I L , I N C . , WALKER ENERGY
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, I N C . ,
a n d DUCHESNE COUNTY, a b o d y
politic,
Defendants.

]
]
]
;
;
)

Civil

No.

87-CV-13D

The above captioned matter came before the Court January 19,
1988, pursuant to Tech-Fluid Services, inc.'s, (Tech-Fluid) Order
to Show Cause.

Tech-Fluid was represented by its attorneys,

Harry Souvall and L.A. Dever.

Wind River Resources Corporation

(Wind River) was represented by its attorney, Clark B. Allred.
The principal issue presented by the Order to Show Cause was
whether Tech-Fluid or Wind River had acquired Paiute Oil & Mining
Corporation's (Paiute) interest in a certain oil and gas well.
Tech-Fluid advanced three arguments claiming that the Trustee in
Bankruptcyr not Paiute, was the holder of the redemption rights;
that Tech-Fluid had executed on the redemption rights and that

Wind River had failed to comply with Rule 69 when it redeemed the
property.

The facts upon which the Court was to decide these

issues was stipulated to, at oral argument and then listed in
Wind River's Memorandum.

The Court having heard argument on

January 19, 1988; the parties having submitted Memoranda on the
three issues advanced by Tech-Fluids and the Court being fully
advised, enters the following Conclusions of Law.
1.

The Trustee

in the Paiute bankruptcy

abandoned the

subject property long before there were any redemption rights and
that

abandonment

rights.

included

the abandonment

of

any

redemption

The bankruptcy estate did not have any interest in those

redemption rights and therefore, the assignment of the redemption
rights to Wind River was valid.
2.
executed

Redemption

rights

upon.

allow

protection
rights

and

To

provided
the

are

not

property

such an action

by the statutes which

policies

Therefore, Tech-Fluid's

and purposes

of

which

would
created

can

be

destroy any
redemption

redemption rights.

attempt to execute on the redemption

rights was of no effect.
3.

Wind River's redemption was in substantial compliance

with Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tech-Fluid

received everything to which it was entitled and has not shown
that it was prejudiced by Wind River's failure to provide a copy
of the judgment docket, particularly where, in this case, there
2

was no judgment docketed.
DATED this^Mday of February, 1988.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge
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CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Wind River
Resources Corporation
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, INC.,

;
i
]

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

;

PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP.,
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, INC.,
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body
politic,

j
]
]
;

Defendants.

]

Civil No. 87-CV-13D

The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling, Plaintiff's Motion
dated February 10, 1988, and Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed
Conclusions of Law and Order.

The Court having reviewed the

Motions and Memoranda, filed by the parties, hereby finds that
the Court has already ruled on the sufficiency of compliance with
Rule 69.

The Court further finds that the redeeming party need

not pay the balance due on the lien.
has

been

extinguished.

The

The lien of the Plaintiff

Plaintiff,

when

it

had

its

foreclosure, had the opportunity to bid a sufficient amount to
protect

its

interest.

The

Court

furthermore,

finds

that

Plaintiff's interpretation of Rule 69 is not correct, but rather

the interpretation propounded by Wind River is proper.

Based on

these findings the Court hereby enters the following Order:
1.

Plaintiff's

Motion

to

Alter

or

Amend

Ruling

and

Plaintiff's Motion dated February 10, 1988 are hereby denied.
2.

The parties, at oral argument, stipulated to the facts,

which stipulated facts are also set forth in the Memoranda.

The

Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff's objections and has signed
the Conclusions of Law and Order submitted by Wind River.
DATED this

day of March, 1988.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge
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I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the
foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
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